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By WILLIAM H. HENNING and GRANT S. NELSON 285
AVOIDANCE OF COMPLETED REAL
ESTATE FORECLOSURES IN BANKRuPTCY
The Eighth Circuit has ruled that in certain situations
noncollusive real estate foreclosures can be set aside as
fraudulent conveyances. This theory has generated
considerable debate, but even if it is reversed legislatively-
trustees may be able to obtain comparable results under a
preference theory.
WHEN A MISSOURI DEED OF
TRUST is foreclosed pursuant to a pow-
er of sale, there is only a limited statu-
tory right of redemption,1 This right will
be triggered only if the debtor posts a
redemption bond and the mortgagee is
the successful foreclosure purchaser.
Further, the prevailing judicial attitude
is that the sale will not be set aside un-
less the price is so low that it "shocks the
conscience" of the court and raises an
inference of fraud or unfair dealing by
the mortgagee or trustee.2 As long as the
proper procedures are followed, the
debtor is not entitled to avoidance or
monetary damages for mere inadequacy
of price. As a result of these policies, it is
not unusual for the debtor's equity to be
sacrificed by foreclosure.
3
In the last few years, courts interpret-
ing the bankruptcy laws have fashioned
a novel theory which creates, in effect, a
de facto federal right of redemption.
The theory views a foreclosure sale that
brings less than 70 percent of the prop-
erty's fair market value as a voidable
fraudulent conveyance if the sale occurs
while the debtor is insolvent and within
one year prior to the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings. The theory
originated with a decision of the United
________________________________________________ J.
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, Durrett v. Washington Nation-
al Insurance Co., 4 and it was approved
last year by the Eighth Circuit in In re
Hulm.5 Thus, the Durrett doctrine, as it
has come to be called, is now the law in
Missouri.
The doctrine has been highly con-
troversial and has been opposed
nationally by the real estate bar.6 De-
spite vigorous debate, it was not
changed by the Bankruptcy Amend-
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ments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, 7 but there is reason to believe that
it may yet be overturned legislatively. If
that occurs, however, it is possible that a
similar result may be achieved by ana-
lyzing foreclosure sales as voidable pref-
erences rather than fraudulent con-
veyances. There is some case authority
for this proposition, but the preference
theory has not yet been fully developed
because of the ready availability of Dur-
rett. The purpose of this article is to
explain both theories to the Missouri
Bar.
The Durrett doctrine is based on a
literal reading of portions of section
548(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
(the "Code"). The relevant language
states:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property . . . that
was made . . . within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily
(2)(A) received less than reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such trans-
fer ... ;and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such
transfer was made ... or became insolvent
as a result of such transfer.... 8
There is a split among the circuits as
to whether a foreclosure sale constitutes
a transfer for purposes of section 548.
The vast majority of lower courts have
held that it does and have based their
decisions on the statutory definition of
transfer, which specifically includes in-
voluntary dispositions of property.9 The
Ninth Circuit, however, examined the
history of fraudulent conveyances and
held that a foreclosure sale that does not
involve collusive conduct by the debtor
does not constitute a transfer for pur-
poses of section 548. 1o This decision was
probably legislatively overruled 1 in
1984 by amendments making "foreclo-
sure of the debtor's equity of redemp-
tion" part of the definition of transfer
and adding the phrase "voluntarily or
involuntarily" to section 548(a). The
Sixth Circuit has also rejected Durrett,
reasoning that the price received at a
noncollusive foreclosure sale constitutes
reasonably equivalent value as a matter
of law.' 2
In Hulm, a case based on pre-1984
law, the Eighth Circuit held that a fore-
closure sale is a transfer within the
meaning of section 548.13 With that
issue resolved, the other elements of an
avoidance action under section 548 are
(1) disposition within one year prior to
commencement of bankruptcy, (2) of an
interest of the debtor in property, (3)
made while the debtor is insolvent, and
(4) made for less than a reasonably
equivalent value.
The foreclosure sale
must occur within one
year prior to
bankruptcy
Under the first element, the foreclo-
sure sale must occur within one year
prior to bankruptcy, but the period of
uncertainty for the purchaser at the sale
may actually be much longer. An avoid-
ance action under section 548 may be'
initiated until the earlier of two years
after the appointment of a trustee or the
time the case is closed or dismissed. 14
Since a trustee may never be appointed
in a Chapter 11 reorganization, a debtor
in possession can bring an avoidance ac-
tion at any time during the pendency of
the bankruptcy -proceedings. 15 Even in
a Chapter 7 liquidation the period of
uncertainty may exceed three years. 16
As to the second element, a foreclo-
sure sale unquestionably disposes of an
interest of the debtor in property. In
Hulm, a case arising out of a judicial
foreclosure sale in North Dakota, the
Eighth Circuit noted that the sale di-
vested Hulm of legal title, the right to
possession, and his equity of redemp-
tion. 7 This element would also be satis-
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fled by any nonjudicial foreclosure sale
in Missouri. 18
The third element requires that the
debtor be insolvent at the time of the
foreclosure sale, and the test to be ap-
plied is based on the definition of insol-
vent at section 101(29) of the Code. 19 In
order to be insolvent, the sum of the
debtor's liabilities must exceed the sum
of his or her assets. In applying the test,
the fair market value of the foreclosed
property must be included as an asset
with the value of any liens as a liability.
The final element requires that the
property be sold for less than reasonably
equivalent value, and this element has
produced some controversy. In Dur-
rett, the foreclosure sale brought rough-
ly 58 percent of the property's fair mar-
ket value and the Fifth Circuit sug-
gested that a sale for less than 70 percent
could be avoided.2 ° Even though Dur-
rett did not specifically establish 70 per-
cent as the dividing line, that percent-
age has become a rule of thumb in the
ensuing cases. The Eighth Circuit did
not discuss percentages in Hulm and re-
manded the case for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the fore-
closure sale price was a 'reasonably
equivalent value for the property. 21 The
Court did, however, expressly dis-
approve of the theory that absent fraud
or collusion the price received at a fore-
closure sale should be deemed a reason-
ably equivalent value as a matter of
law. 22 It seems likely that the 70 percent
rule will become the norm in the Eighth
Circuit.
The Durrett theory can be used in a
Chapter 7 proceeding or in reorganiza-
tion cases under Chapters 11 and 1323
Moreover, unlike under statutory re-
demption, where the redeeming debtor
must pay the mortgage debt, 24 reliance
on Durrett requires no such out of
pocket expenditure. Once the trustee
(or debtor exercising the rights of a trus-
tee in a reorganization 5 ) proves the ele-
ments listed above, the property can be
recovered from the immediate purchas-
er or from any subsequent purchaser
who gives less than fair market value. 
2 6
The purchaser is then granted a lien on
the property for any value given. 27 In a
Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee will
then proceed to sell the property free of
all liens and satisfy the purchaser's lien
from the sale proceeds. 28 The equity
becomes an asset of the estate. In a reor-
ganization proceeding in which the
property is to be retained by the debtor,
The final element requires
the property be sold for
less than reasonably
equivalent value
the purchaser's lien will typically be
satisfied by payments under the plan.
The purchaser becomes, in effect, a
forced lender.
While recovering the excess value of
foreclosed property for distribution to
unsecured creditors is consistent with
basic bankruptcy policies, the Durrett
doctrine does create some serious prob-
lems. First, the period of uncertainty
following foreclosure is entirely too
long. It exists for a minimum of one
year, and if the debtor commences
bankruptcy during that period the
threat of avoidance can linger for three
years or more. The long period of uncer-
tainty may tend to chill bidding at fore-
closure sales and prevent development
of the land following the sale.
29
Second, avoidance can be inequitable
when applied to purchasers other than
the original lender. For example, sup-
pose the lender buys residential realty
at the foreclosure sale and then resells
through a broker to a purchaser who
intends to live in the home. While the
purchaser has the right to prevent
avoidance by paying the trustee the dif-
ference between the value of the pur-
chaser's lien and the property's fair mar-
ket value, the exercise of this right may
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prove economically burdensome. In
some instances, the purchaser may be
forced to give up the home.
A third problem occurs in reorganiza-
tion cases where the ultimate purchaser
is a non-lender. Even if the purchaser is"adequately protected" in the sense that
she will ultimately receive 100 percent
of her investment through the plan, se-
rious consequences can ensue from hav-
ing funds tied up for a significant period
of time. This is less of a problem where
the purchaser is a lender whose ordinary
business activities involve repayment of
funds over time.
In addition to avoidance as a fraudu-
lent conveyance, a pre-bankruptcy fore-
closure sale that brings less than fair
market value may also be attacked as a
preference. Because of the pervasive
impact of Durrett, the preference
approach is still in its embryonic stage.
However, if Durrett is legislatively
overruled the preference theory is cer-
tain to be utilized more frequently.
Consequently, it is important to under-
stand the theory and how it differs from
Durrett.
Under section 547(b)3" of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the trustee may avoid a
transaction if it was (1) a transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property, (2) to
or for the benefit of a creditor, (3) for or
on account of an antecedent debt, (4)
made while the debtor was insolvent, (5)
made within 90 days before the com-
mencement of bankruptcy (or between
90 days and one year in the case of
insiders31), and (6) which enables the
creditor to realize more than he would
have received in a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion.
The first element is identical with one
of the elements in section 548(a) and is
satisfied by the same analysis applicable
in that context. The second, third and
fifth elements are likewise non-
controversial. If the mortgagee pur-
chases at the foreclosure sale the trans-
fer will be to a creditor; if a third party
purchases, it will be for the benefit of a
creditor. Since the foreclosure sale is a
separate transfer it will always be for an
antecedent debt.
The fourth element requires, like sec-
tion 548(a), that the debtor be insolvent
on the date of the sale, but the trustee's
proof will be easier than in the Durrett
context. Under section 547(), the debt-
or is presumed to have been insolvent
during the 90 days preceding bankrupt-
cy and the trustee will have to prove
insolvency only in cases where the pre-
sumption is rebutted or the transfer was,
to an insider and occurred before the
90-day period commenced.
The sixth element is also present
where the sale brings less than fair mar-
ket value, but only if the mortgagee is
the purchaser. If the transfer had not
occurred, the mortgagee would have
been treated as a creditor with a secured
claim in a Chapter 7 proceeding and
would have ultimately received the full
value of the debt. By virtue of purchas-
ing at the foreclosure sale; however, the
mortgagee also obtains the debtor's
equity, an asset that would have gone to
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding. Thus, the mortgagee obtains
more by way of foreclosure than it would
have obtained in bankruptcy. This ele-
ment will not be satisfied if a third party
purchases at the foreclosure sale since
the mortgagee will only be allowed to
retain the amount of the debt.
It can be argued that this analysis is at
odds with the purpose of section 547
because the concept of preference only
applies to the extent that a creditor -is
paid up to the full amount of the debt.
Any excess is not a preference but rather
a fraudulent conveyance voidable under
section 548.32 This argument is, howev-
er, unpersuasive. First, the language of
section 547 applies literally to this situa-
tion and it is difficult to argue against a
cause of action that is specifically de-
fined in terms of elements when those
elements clearly are satisfied. More-
over, this anti-preference reasoning
reaches the ironic conclusion that sec-
tion 547 may be used to deal with the
lesser of two wrongs - namely, the
________________________________________________ 1.
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transfer that gives a creditor up to the
full amount of her claim - but is un-
availing to the extent the transfer gives
her more than her due. Indeed, at least
two cases have considered the issue and
have concluded that section 547 can be
used as a foreclosure-avoidance tool. 33
One of the cases, Matter of Fountain,
was decided by the Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Missouri.
In some respects, the preference
approach is preferable to the Durrett
doctrine. The pre-bankruptcy avoid-
ance period is shortened to 90 days,
although if bankruptcy is initiated dur-
ing that period there may still be several
years of uncertainty. In addition, since
the theory only applies where the mort-
gagee is the purchaser the problem of
inequitable treatment of third parties is
resolved. Thus, third party bidding is
less likely to be discouraged than in the
Durrett setting. On the other hand,
since the focus of the preference ap-
proach is on whether the mortgagee re-
ceived more than it would have received
in a Chapter 7 liquidation, unlike Dur-
rett it may be used to recapture proper-
ty where more than 70 percent of fair
market value has been paid at the fore-
closure sale.
CONCLUSION. Durrett and its prefer-
ence theory counterpart are strong
medicine. Any post-sale period of title
defeasibility doubtless discourages fore-
closure sale bidding. Indeed, because
Missouri statutory redemption is un-
available if a third party purchases, such
parties have heretofore been uncon-
cerned about its conseqences. As a re-
sult, Durrett may alter third party bid-
ding practice to a greater degree in Mis-
souri than in those states where such
purchasers are not insulated from statu-
tory redemption claims. We are admit-
tedly troubled by this prospect. On the
other hand, the benefits of Durrett and
the preference alternative to unsecured
creditors may outweigh the foregoing
concern. As one of us has stressed in an
earlier context, "there is no reason to
permit secured creditors to reap the
benefit of assets that might have paid off
unsecured creditors. -34 Moreover, both
theories underscore in a powerful way
the inadequacies of a foreclosure system
that normally fails to produce an ade-
quate price for foreclosed real estate.
Neither Durrett nor related theories
are desirable as a permanent part of the
foreclosure landscape. The long term
solution to the problems they address
lies in a major structural reform of state
foreclosure practices. In an earlier
article, 35 one of us described in detail a
foreclosure system for Missouri that we
believe will enhance the likelihood that
fair market value will be obtained for
foreclosed real estate. Under such a sys-
tem, mortgaged real estate would be
sold in a manner closely approximating
how property is sold in an ordinary non-
foreclosure context. W ile the proposed
system provides for a substantial pre-
foreclosure time pe iod to cure default,
there would be 6 post-sale redemp-
tion. Such a system, we believe, would
enhance the lilkelihood of foreclosure
surpluses and reduce the number of de-
ficiency judgments, a result that would
benefit unsecured creditors as well as
mortgagors and junor lienors. Under
such a system, Durrett, its preference
counterpart and statutory 'redemption
would be both unnecessary and self-
defeating. El
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